In March 1995 we conducted a survey on the tenacity and strength of antisemitic prejudice in Hungary. 1500 personal interviews were carried out, which were based on a standardized questionnaire and each lasting about 60 minutes. The group surveyed was representative of the Hungarian adult population (aged over 18 years) in terms of gender, age, place of residence, and level of education. The primary aim of the study was to measure the extent and strenght of antisemitic prejudice and to give a causal explanation for the presence of antisemitic views in the Hungarian society.

According to the results of our examination, 29% of the Hungarian adult population is non-antisemitic, 25% antisemitic, and 32% accept some of the economic stereotypes formed over the centuries about the Jews without thesestereotypes being accompanied by any particular antisemitic feeling. The attitudes of a further 14% cannot be measured owing to the high number of missing responses; given the indifference, this group is also to be classed among the non-antisemites.

Antisemitism in Hungary is currently a phenomenon of the capital city: antisemitic prejudice occurs more frequently among residents of Budapest than among residents of other settlements. Apart from the place of residence, other social-demographic variables do not directly correlate with antisemitic prejudice. Age, education, and disposable economic-social resources do, however, indirectly affect the degree of anti-Jewish prejudice - by way of other attitudes. Xenophobia is more common among older and less educated groups; and antisemitism is one of the manifestations of this phenomenon. Our observations indicate that in sections of society with diminishing economic-social resources the feeling of anomie is stronger than in other social groups disposing of a greater number of such resources. In turn, anomie induces antisemitic feelings both directly and indirectly - by generating xenophobia. In combination, anomie and conservative attitudes particularly strengthen the inclination towards extreme antisemitism. By themselves, religious-conservative views and attitudes do not induce antisemitism. The inclination towards antisemitism among groups with such religious-conservative attitudes is most pronounced among those groups in which the feeling of anomie is strong or in which antisemitism performs the function of a code for the expression of ideological and political positions. In this last group, which amounts to about 1% of the total adult population, antisemitism is a political phenomenon.

The experiences of recent years indicate that since the fall of the communist system, antisemitism has strengthened in Hungary, or at least, underlying antisemitic attitudes and ideologies are now expressed more openly. The transformation of the political system led to a dismantling of the taboo that had previously surrounded antisemitism, and in the first years after 1990 it seemed that antisemitism might rapidly gain ground in Hungarian society as the country faced up to the economic and social challenges of the transition. Nobody knew, however, the extent to which this fear was legitimate and the degree to which Hungarian society was inclined to adopt the reemerging antisemitic ideology. In Hungarian political life open antisemitism has remained a marginal phenomenon. On the other hand, the manifestation of various forms of antisemitism in post-Communist Hungary bears witness to the existence of an antisemitic potential. But the tenacity and strength of antisemitic prejudice in Hungary was not known exactly. We did not know the extent to which prejudice is able to influence political and social actions of society; nor did we know which sections of society were most susceptible to antisemitic rhetoric.

We were also unaware of the changes that have taken place in historical consciousness during more than fifty years since the Holocaust. The experiences of western countries indicate that the most effective weapon against xenophobia, racism, and the reappearance of antisemitism is to incorporate into historical consciousness the results of a frank confrontation with the past and an open discussion of the responsibility felt for Nazism, the persecution of the Jews, and the Holocaust. However, for some fifty years after the war and the persecution of the Jews, all these issues were either wrapped in a veil of silence or were discussed — in both school textbooks and in public — in accordance with the requirements of the Communist party state. We could only guess how much the Hungarian public knew about the history of the Jews in Hungary and their role in Hungarian history; or what it knew about the “Hungarian Holocaust,” the great number of victims, and the responsibility for the persecutions. In a word, we did not know the extent to which historical memory is capable of producing an antidote that can be used to prevent the reappearance of antisemitism.

All these questions and considerations led us, in 1995, to begin empirical research into antisemitism in Hungary. Our study was the first in-depth examination of this problem in Hungary since the Second World War. One of the most important aims of the study was to gain an impression of the extent, content, strength and ability to mobilize antisemitic prejudice. In the following pages, we summarize some of the results of our research so that we may form an impression of the strength of antisemitism in Hungary today.¹

Previous Research

Although our examination is the first comprehensive sociological survey of antisemitism in Hungary, questionnaires drawn up in the course of previous sociological studies have included questions which offer some indication as to the strength of antisemitic prejudice — above all the size of extremist antisemitic sections of society — in post-Communist Hungary.

The first such study was a comparative analysis initiated by the American Jewish Committee in 1991. The researchers, however, did not attempt to measure antisemitism in general. Instead they chose just a few questions on which to focus their analysis. Nevertheless, based on the responses of participants in the survey, it is possible to form an impression of the size of entrenched antisemitic groups in Hungary and other countries in the region. The results of this earlier survey were the following:

Table 1. “Do you feel that the following groups have too much influence, too little influence, or the right amount of influence in our society ... Jews”

(percentage)

.	too much	too little	right amount	don’t know
Hungary	17	13	51	19
Poland	26	5	27	42
Czechoslovakia	11	21	27	41
Czechs	5	23	28	44
Slovaks	25	16	25	34
Austria	28	7	48	17

Table 2. “How do you feel about having Jews in your neighborhood? Would you like to have some Jewish neighbors, wouldn’t it make any difference to you, or would you prefer not to have any Jewish neighbors?”
(percentage)

.	like to have	wouldn’t matter	prefer not	don’t know
Hungary	16	65	17	2
Poland	3	51	40	6
Czechoslovakia	5	62	23	10
Czechs	5	66	20	9
Slovaks	5	52	32	11
Austria	7	54	31	8

Table 3.  “Do any of the following groups behave in a manner which provokes hostility in our country ... Jews”
(percentage)

.	yes	no	don’t know
Hungary	6	90	4
Poland	19	65	16
Czechoslovakia	6	64	30
Czechs	2	70	28
Slovaks	14	51	35
Austria	14	-	-

Table 4. “Which statement comes closer to your opinion: Jews are an integral part of our nation, or Jews are outsiders to our society?”
(percentage)

.	integral	outsiders	neither	both	don’t know
Hungary	75	10	3	4	8
Poland	44	16	11	8	21
Czechoslovakia	52	11	13	5	20
Czechs	54	12	12	3	19
Slovaks	49	9	14	7	21

The AJC study indicates, therefore, that about 10–17% of the Hungarian population is inclined to agree with expressly antisemitic statements. Thus, in 1991, antisemitic prejudice was perhaps slightly stronger in Hungary than among the Czechs, but weaker than in Slovakia, and considerably weaker than in Poland and in Austria.

However, another impression is gained from a study performed by reseaof the Faculty of Sociology of Vienna University in the autumn of 1995 and the spring of 1996.² The researchers in Vienna also avoided a complex measurement of antisemitism. Instead, examining the relationship between patriotism and nationalism, they tried to grasp anti-Jewish prejudice among the surveyed population by posing a number of questions in a manner similar to the AJC project.

Table 5. Measurement of antisemitic prejudice
(percentage and averages); (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)
 

.	1	2	3	4	average
- As Christians we should reject the Jews
Hungary	3	7	21	69	3.6
Czechs	3	6	26	65	3.5
Slovaks	3	6	24	67	3.6
Poland	4	9	29	58	3.4
- Jews have too much influence in our country
Hungary	18	21	30	31	2.7
Czechs	3	10	37	50	3.3
Slovaks	8	18	36	38	3.0
Poland	13	24	35	28	2.8
Austria	14	23	35	28	2.8
- Jews have too much influence in the international financial and business world
Hungary	30	25	25	20	2.4
Czechs	15	32	32	21	2.6
Slovaks	29	35	24	12	2.2
Poland	19	29	30	22	2.6
- The annihilation of the Jews also had positive consequences for the country
Hungary	6	10	28	56	3.3
Czechs	3	8	29	60	3.5
Slovaks	4	11	32	53	3.3
Poland	9	25	35	31	2.9
Austria	5	14	29	53	3.3
- Jews control international politics
Hungary	15	25	32	28	2.7
Czechs	7	23	40	30	2.9
Slovaks	21	30	32	17	2.5
Poland	16	27	34	23	2.6
Austria	23	32	26	19	2.4
Many exaggerated statements have been made concerning the persecution of the Jews and the concentration camps
Hungary	7	11	23	59	3.3
Czechs	2	6	22	70	3.6
Slovaks	4	10	28	58	3.4
Poland	4	7	29	60	3.4
Austria	6	14	26	55	3.3

Table 6. Support for anti-Jewish discrimination
(percentage and averages)
 

.	yes	no	average
- Should the employment of Jews in important professions be subjected to controls and restrictions?
Hungary	19	81	1.8
Czechs	12	88	1.9
Slovaks	21	79	1.8
Poland	31	69	1.7
Austria	28	72	1.7
- Should the enrichment of Jews and their ability to found businesses be limited by law?
Hungary	23	77	1.8
Czechs	14	86	1.9
Slovaks	23	77	1.8
Poland	35	65	1.6

Although the responses to these questions should not be evaluated in isolation from the meaning of these statements in the specific historical context of the “Jewish question” in the various countries and its role in the political and press debates at the time of the survey, certain trends do, nevertheless, emerge.

According to the University of Vienna’s survey, antisemitic prejudice is strongest among the Poles and the Austrians and weaker among the Czechs and the Hungarians, but the survey also indicates that the attitudes of the Hungarian population on this issue are rather polarized: Based on the responses given to eight questions, Hungarians rank first among the antisemitic respondents on three occasions, while among non-antisemitic respondents, Hungarians rank first place on one occasion and second place on five occasions. Among the surveyed populations, a majority of respondents chose antisemitic responses on three occasions: once the Slovaks, once the Austrians and once the Hungarians. Among Hungarians between 10% and 55% of respondents gave antisemitic answers, and it seems that 10-20% of respondents belong to the extremist antisemitic core. The data of the study do not permit more precise estimates to be made.

In 1994, Hungarian researchers studied the relationship between prejudice and authoritarianismin post-Communist Hungary, and in the course of the examination posed questions that were also connected with antisemitism.³With their questionnaire, comprising 27 questions, the researchers did not aim to measure the strength of antisemitism, but strove instead to determine the types of value-systems around which antisemitic prejudice forms. The final result of the study was that religious, ethnocentric and political forms of antisemitism can easily be distinguished from one another in Hungary today. Moreover the researchers also found that the inclination or tendency towards discrimination represents an independent factor within the system of attitudes; thus this inclination is not an automatic consequence of prejudice.

It is worth examining the distribution of responses given to the various questions used in the study.⁴

Table 7.  Political antisemitism

(Responses on a four-grade Likert scale, 4 = fully agree; percentage)

.	N	fully or partially agree	average
Jews have always had great influence on the left-wing movements	621	33	2.56
Jews even try to gain advantage from their own persecution	837	39		2.40
Jewish intellectuals control the press and cultural sphere	761	30	2.22
There exists a secret Jewish network determining political and economic affairs	583	23	2.22
Liberal parties represent primarily Jewish interests	612	21	2.15
Jews are the ones who have really benefited from the change of system	827	28	2.13

Table 8. Discriminative antisemitism

(Responses on a four-grade Likert-scale, 4 = fully agree; percentage)
 

.	N		fully or partially agree		average
It would be better if the Jews would live in their own state, in Israel		940		24	1.90
Marriages between Jews and non-Jews are not good for either of the partners		850		17	1.72
In certain areas of employment, the number of Jews should be limited.		924		18	1.72

 

As the table shows, 17–39% of respondents to the questions measuring political and discriminative antisemitism chose an antisemitic reply. (The proportion of missing answers was relatively high). In addition to the above nine questions, the questionnaire posed a further nineteen questions concerning Jews. By examining nine of these further questions we may gain a more precise impression of the extent to which antisemitic views are accepted in Hungary.

Table 9. Expressed agreement with statements concerning Jews

(Replies on a four-point Likert scale; percentage)

.	fully or partially agree	do not know / no answer
Jews generally disdain the Christian faith	29	21
The crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable sin of the Jews	26	20
The suffering of the Jewish people was God’s punishment	25	20
In the 1950s, the ÁVH (secret police) was used by Jews to take revenge	26	34
Jews are rather all the same	40	9
Jews are always unsatisfied and critical	25	17
The existence of anti-Jewish feeling is primarily the fault of the Jews themselves	30	13
Jews in Hungary have many strange customs	38	30
There is something strange about Jews	38	12

If — on the basis of the responses to the eighteen questions — we wish to form a scale that is capable of measuring the strength of antisemitism, then as a first step we can simply total the scores received by the various respondents on the four-point scale. Thus we can say that those respondents who totaled less than 36 points for the eighteen questions are non-antisemites; those who totaled more than 54 points are extreme antisemites. Those with between 37 and 53 points are positioned somewhere between the non-antisemites and the extreme antisemites. Employing this calculation, we find that the proportion of extreme antisemites among respondents is 5%, while that of non-antisemites is 70%.

However, these results are immediately open to dispute. It is obvious that the low score of some respondents on the scale is due to the fact that they gave no reply to the some of the questions. Indeed, if we look at the distribution of replies, we observe that for some questions more than 30% of respondents refused to reply. Therefore the results must be adjusted by the number of missing responses. We did this by grouping the respondents into three groups according to the number of missing responses (0–5, 6–11, 12–18 refusals), and into four groups according to the number of points scored (0–18, 19–36, 37–53, 54–72 points). Then we examined the extent to which the number of missing responses may have affected the number of points scored.
 

Table 10.  The relationship between the score on the antisemitism scale and the number of missing responses
(percentage)

.	number of missing responses
.	0–5	6–11	12–18
0–18 points	4 (non-antisemite)	8 (non-antisemite)	5 (unclassifiable)
19–36 points	40 (non-antisemite)	13 (antisemite)	0
37–53 points	23 (antisemite)	1 (extreme antisemite)	0
54–72 points	6 (extreme antisemite)	0	0

Those who gave no reply to fewer than six questions (73 %) were classified on the basis of the number of points scored on the scale into three groups — non-antisemites, antisemites, and extreme antisemites. Those, on the other hand, who gave no reply to more than two thirds of the questions (5 % of total respondents) were not classified into any of the groups. The main problem was posed by the 22% of respondents who gave no reply to between six and eleven questions, i.e., to about half the total number of questions. Respondents in this group who scored high points even though they answered relatively few questions, were classified into one or another antisemitic group. The greatest uncertainty — as the table shows — surrounds classification of those who on the basis of 7–12 answers scored a maximum of eighteen points. Based on their scores members of this group are placed among the non-antisemites, but the high number of missing responses leaves two other possibilities of interpretation open: no reply could be a sign of latent antisemitism, or it might mean a lack of any attitude whatsoever.

Whatever the case, based on the survey performed by Enyedi, Erus, Fábián we may conclude that in 1994 about 7% of Hungary’s population could be considered as extremely antisemitic, while about 50 % was non-antisemitic, and 40 % possessed some form of anti-Jewish prejudice.

Among the antecedents of the 1995 research, mention should also be made of the studies which I myself have performed in recent years. Between 1992 and 1995, in the course of various public opinion research projects — which were primarily concerned with party preferences — I often asked participants in the surveys to state whether or not they belonged to certain groups. Among the classified groups, there was one group made up of those who “bear hostility towards Jews.” Irrespective of changes in political preferences and opinions, 7–14% of respondents classified themselves in this group. This figure indicates that at the beginning of the 1990s, 10% of the adult population in Hungary could be considered — to a lesser or greater degree — consciously antisemitic.

More detailed results were provided by the examination which I performed in 1993 concerning the strength of antisemitic prejudice among members of a specific social group — university and college students. The choice of this group was not arbitrary: the study sought to disclose the strength and extent of antisemitism among possible members of the country’s future elite. This study — the results of which can be reviewed in detail elsewhere⁵ — demonstrated that about 8% of present Hungarian college and university students are extreme antisemites, 18% are antisemites, 32% accept some antisemitic stereotypes, and 43% are non-antisemites.

The 1995 Study

In March 1995 we held personal interviews, each lasting about 60 minutes, with 1,500 individuals. The group surveyed was representative of the Hungarian adult population (aged over 18 years) in terms of gender, age, place of residence, and education.⁶ The primary aim of the study was to provide a more precise impression of the extent and strength of antisemitic prejudice in Hungary in the 1990s.

As we have seen, the results of the surveys performed between 1990 and 1995 indicated the probable strength of antisemitism in Hungary after the collapse of the Communist system, but they also demonstrated in which areas research still needed to be done. The surveys showed the presence of a hard antisemitic core representing about 10% of the adult Hungarian population; the proportion of non-antisemites was 40–50%. However, where to place the 40–50% of the population that did not belong to either group remained an open question. This question leads to one of the basic problems of empirical research into antisemitism, a question that we have also had to face in the course of our examination.

Some researchers into antisemitism — especially in the opening stages, that is, in the 1940s and 1950s — worked according to the additive method. When making their measurements, these researchers simply calculated the number of antisemitic statements — present in the questionnaire — with which survey participants agreed. Use of this method generally permitted researchers to identify definitely antisemitic groups and definitely non-antisemitic groups, for the questionnaires always included statements with which only antisemites could agree, or there was always a group that rejected most of the antisemitic statements — whose members, therefore, could not possibly be antisemites. However, a constant difficulty lay, in the fact that — as in the case of the examinations already mentioned — a large proportion of survey participants were positioned between the two extreme groups, and that any further differentiation within this intermediate group based on the additive scale could seem — quite rightly — arbitrary.

The second general problem associated with the additive scales is connected with the statements that measure antisemitism. It is immediately obvious that agreement with, for example, the statement “Jews are rather all the same” does not express the same strength of prejudice — if indeed it expresses any prejudice at all, and does not simply indicate a tendency to stereotype — as does agreement with the statement concerning “the existence of a secret Jewish network determining political and economic affairs,” On the additive scale, agreement with any statement is of the same value, and this makes it even more difficult to differentiate between groups of varying degrees of prejudice.

A number of solutions to these problems of measurement have been proposed in recent decades, and these solutions have gradually squeezed out the additive method from studies into prejudice. The introduction of the tripartite model of prejudice had the greatest effect on the new methods and procedures.

Theories of social psychology on prejudice long ago drew attention to the fact that there are three dimensions of prejudice: the content of prejudice, the emotional intensity of prejudice, and the inclination to discriminate on the basis of prejudice — i.e., the cognitive, emotive, and conative dimensions of prejudice. It was only later, however, that empirical research into prejudice began to attempt to measure prejudice in each of the three dimensions and then — after some kind of aggregating of the three independent results — position members of the surveyed population somewhere on the scale of prejudice. We attempted this in 1993 when performing the survey among university students, and in 1995 we once again based our measurement of antisemitism on the three-dimensional model.

The other fundamental problem of measurement is how to form a scale. As we have seen, simply adding together the responses is not sufficient if we are to obtain a differentiated impression of the extent and strength of antisemitic prejudice. However, other solutions are not without their own problems. When performing the survey in 1993, the replies of survey participants to the questions on three scales of measuring prejudice — scales measuring the cognitive, emotive, and conative dimensions — were weighted in proportion to the number of the replies expressing agreement, i.e., when the final scores were being calculated, prejudiced opinions shared by many were given less weight than opinions with which few agreed. Subsequently, we calculated the scale scores in such a way that the scores received for the various replies were simply added together. Having standardized the scales — as the result of which their average became zero and their standard deviation one — we used cluster analysis to place the survey participants into groups according to degree of prejudice. This was done in such a way that those who had achieved less than average scores on all three scales were placed in the non-antisemitic group; those who had achieved much higher scores on all three scales than the average were placed among the extreme antisemites; while, on the bof the results of the cluster analysis, the others were placed among those with an inclination towards antisemitism (above average score on cognitive scale, below average scores on the other two) and in the group of antisemites (somewhat above average scores on all three scales).⁷

This form of measurement undoubtedly gave a more accurate and precise impression of the strength of anti-Jewish prejudice than methods employing additive scales had done previously, but with this technique we relativized our means of measurement in two ways. First, the weight of the various statements became dependent upon the degree of acceptance of the given statements among the surveyed group. In addition, the scale of measurement established was not absolute, but measured antisemitism in relation to average prejudice. One can argue in favor of this technique,⁸ but we did not apply the method in full during the 1995 survey. We dispensed with the weighting of replies. These methodological decisions were taken because we supposed that in a sample representative of the whole of the population replies will tend to be much more inconsistent than among a population of university students — that is, in a group with uniformly high educational qualifications. We thought that, while among university students it could be expected that prejudice could be ordered in accordance with the Guttmann scale — in other words, that those who agreed with statements of prejudice shared by a few would also accept prejudices harbored by many, system of prejudice in the population as a whole would not be so consistent, and therefore it could not be supposed that prejudices shared by many would be of less weight than those accepted by a few.

During the 1995 survey, we established antisemitism scales using factor (principal component) analysis. Prejudiced stereotyping (the cognitive dimension), the degree of emotional saturation of prejudice and social distance (the emotive dimension), and the inclination to discriminate were each measured using those questions which, in the course of the factor analysis, had been placed on these three principal components.⁹  The distribution of the replies to the questions forming three scales is the following:

Table 11. The scale of prejudiced stereotyping
(percentage)
(State whether, in your opinion, the following traits are characteristic or not characteristic of the Jews)

.	characteristic	not characteristic	don’t know,  no answer
Rapacious	62	23	15
Pushy	66	19	15
Materialistic	78	9	13
Greedy	45	37	18
Aggressive	21	62	17
Supercilious	22	60	18
Vengeful	13	67	20
Cunning	63	23	14

Table 12. The scale of emotional saturation of prejudice and social distance
(percentage)

.	yes/ rather agree	no/rather not agree	don’t know,  no answer
Accept as a neighbor	81	15	4
Sympathetic	43	28	26 (neither yes or no); 3
One should always be a bit careful with Jews	35	53	12
It is important to know whether a colleague is a Jew	8	89	3
It is important to know whether a friend is a Jew	12	86	2
It would be better to avoid marriages between Jews and non-Jews	14	72	14
Jews tend to look down on others	22	62	16
It is better if one has little to do with Jews	17	70	13
It would be best if the Jews would leave the country	7	81	12

 

Table 13. The.scale of the inclination to discriminate
(percentage)

.	rather agree	rather disagree	don’t know, no answer
It would be better if fewer Jews were politicians, journalists, and bankers	35	55	10
The extent of Jews’ say in the affairs of the country should reflect their proportion in the population	53	35	13
The Jews should have no influence over political developments at all	10	78	12
Jews should be encouraged to emigrate from Hungary	5	88	7
When doing business with a Jew, one cannot be too careful	41	40	20

Based on the items chosen by the factor analysis, scale scores were given to the respondents in three ways. First, we employed the additive method, i.e., we totaled arithmetically the replies given by the various respondents to the scale questions. In the second and third case, we formed principal components out of the scale items, and thus the replies of respondents were given appropriate scores in all three dimensions. Missing responses were treated differently in the second and third procedures: in one case we employed missing pairwise technique, in the other case missing responses were substituted by the mean of the total replies (mean substitution), and thus were included in the calculations. As can be seen, therefore, just as in 1993, we once again measured the strength of antisemitism against the average for the whole population, because we standardized the additive scale and we also got standardized scores on the factors.

Having established the scales, we performed cluster analysis on the basis of the respondents scores on all three scales. Based on the results of this analysis, we classified the survey participants into groups according to the strength of antisemitism.¹⁰  We formed cluster groups by classifying those who achieved negative, i.e., below average, scale scores on all three scales into the non-antisemites’ group; those who achieved positive scores on the scale of prejudiced stereotyping but negative scores on the distance and discrimination scales into the stereotypers’ group; and those who achieved positive scores (i.e., above average scores) on all three scales or much higher than average scale scores were classified into the antisemites’group or the extreme antisemites’ group.

Use of this technique enabled us to place each respondent into one or another of the groups by three procedures. The results of the three placements are the following:

Table 14.The proportion of antisemites among respondents
(N)

.	additive scale	pc/miss pair	pc/meansub
Non-antisemitic	384	414	400
Stereotyper	492	488	650
Antisemitic	291	255	333
Extreme antisemitic	93	103	90
Unclassifiable	213	213
Total	1473	1473	1473

As table 14 shows, the three different types of classification produced groups of differing sizes. Therefore, as the next step, we examined how many had been classified into the same group in the course of each of the three procedures.

Table 15. Definitive group classification after the three procedures of measurement
(N and percentage)

.	N	percentage
Non-antisemitic	319	22
Stereotyper	378	26
Antisemitic	184	13
Extreme antisemitic	61	4
Total	942	65

With the help of the above procedures, we could place 65% of respondents into one or another group with a considerable degree of certainty; however, the remaining 35% were classified into different groups in the course of the three various procedures. Classification of this group was performed in a separate procedure. As a first step, we formed a secondary principal component from the principal components that were formed out of the items comprising the three scales. Thus an aggregate antisemitism factor was formed on the basis of scores reached on the three scales. Then we examined how many points were scored on this aggregated antisemitism factor by those classified into the various groups as the result of the various procedures. We also examined to which group they were closest, based on the three forms of classification. Based on these two aspects, we decided — on an individual basis — whom to place into which group on the basis of whether — in the course of the three procedures — they had been classified into one group twice, or whether — on the aggregate antisemitism scale — they had achieved the appropriate score for this group. As a result of this procedure, we received the following result, which can be considered as the final result of our survey.

Table 16.

The proportion of antisemites in the Hungarian adult population

(N and percentage)
 

.	N	percentage
Non-antisemites	420	29
Stereotypers	478	32
Antisemites	246	17
Extreme antisemites	116	8
Unclassifiable	213	14
Total	1473	100

According to these figures, 29% of the Hungarian adult population is explicitly non-antisemitic, 25% antisemitic, and 32% accept some of the economic stereotypes formed over the centuries about the Jews without these stereotypes beingaccompanied by any particular antisemitic feeling.¹¹ The attitudes of a further 14% cannot be measured owing to the high number of missing responses; given the indifference, this group is also to be classed among the non-antisemites.¹²

On the basis of all this, we can state that one-quarter of Hungary’s current adult population may be described as antisemitic.

Who Are the Antisemites?

Most theoretical explanations of antisemitism consider the origins of antisemitic prejudices as a combination of the following factors:

•  demographic and social indicators: age, education, place of residence, mobility
•  lack of economic and social resources
•  feeling of subjective deprivation
•  personal, social and political frustration, feeling of anomie
•  consequence of certain ideological attitudes
•  symbolic expression of certain political-ideological self classification
•  xenophobia in general

a) As a first step in our examination, I sought to determine whether there is a correlation between the degree of antisemitism and the basic social and demographic indicators of respondents. Data of surveys undertaken in Western Europe and North America indicate that there is such a connection: prejudice was generally stronger among older, less-educated groups with low social status.¹³ Our previous research, however, had cast doubt on the existence of such a correlation in Hungary. When performing the survey of university students, we did not find a significant correlation between the strength of students’ prejudice and the social background of their families. Such trends as there were did not suggest the presence of a linear correlation between prejudice on the one hand and age, education, social status, or wealth on the other. Instead, there were signs that anti-Jewish prejudice was stronger among the lowest and highest sections of society than among the middle classes. These relationships are examined in the following tables for the whole population.¹⁴

Table 17. Antisemitism by gender
(percentage)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites		extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38		20		9
Male	33	38		19		10
Female	33	38		20		9

Table 18.  Antisemitism by age
(percentage)
 

.	non- antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
18-29	31	43	19	7
30-49	36	38	15	11
50-69	33	37	21	9
70-	34	35	21	10

As table 17 shows, in Hungary there is no difference between the strength of antisemitic prejudice among men and among women. This result agrees with the results of surveys in western countries. However, in Hungary the correlation between antisemitic prejudice and age does not conform to the western model: although there are slightly fewer antisemites than average among the younger age group — and slightly more than average among the older age group — these differences are not significant in statistical terms.

Table 19. Antisemitism by place of residence
(percentage)

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
Budapest	22	33	27	18
City15	32	42	20	6
Town	40	38	17	5
Village, farmstead	36	39	17	8

There are statistically significant differences between the residents of the various types of settlement.¹⁶ As table 19 demonstrates, the proportion of extreme antisemites in Budapest is twice the national average, and while for the whole population the proportion of antisemites and extreme antisemites is 29%, in Budapest — where the great majority (90%) of Hungary’s Jews live — this same proportion is 45%. On the other hand, in provincial towns the proportion of groups harboring antisemitic prejudice is lower than the national average.

Table 20.  Antisemitism by education
(percentage)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
< 8 grades	36	35	20	9
8 grades	37	34	17	12
Vocational	35	35	19	11
High school	28	43	22	7
University, college	35	42	17	6

 

Table 21.  Antisemitism by social status¹⁷
(percentage)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
Lower	37	35	18	10
Lower-middle	36	33	20	11
Middle	28	41	23	8
Upper-middle	32	46	15	7
Upper	28	49	23	0

The table showing the correlation between education and prejudice indicates that — unlike in western countries — in Hungary groups of people of varying educational qualifications do not differ significantly from one another. Although there are fewer than average antisemites among university and college graduates, the number of stereotypers among these groups is higher than average.

There is, however, a weak correlation between social status and antisemitic attitudes:¹⁸ extreme prejudice declines among groups of higher social status, although the proportion of stereotypers increases.

Examination of groups of varying wealth¹⁹ and income levels again indicated that — as among the social status groups and obviously not unrelated to status — only among the highest income groups did the strength of antisemitic prejudice differ from the other groups: in such groups there were fewer than average antisemites and a greater number of persons inclined to accept stereotypes.

Table 22. Antisemitism by income groups
(monthly per capita income in Forints; percentage)
 

	non-ntisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
Under 6 thousand	37	37	13	13
6–12 thousand	35	36	20	9
12–20 thousand	33	37	20	10
20–30 thousand	26	45	23	6
30 thousand or more	39	50	4	4

b) In order to analyze more precisely the relationship between social status and prejudice, we devised a economic-social resource indicator. We developed this indicator as a factor from the three variables analyzed above: status, per capita income, and wealth.²⁰ Subsequently, we examined whether there were any differences between the antisemitism scale groups according to their economic-social resources.

Table 23.  Economic-social resources of the antisemitism scale groups
(factorscore averages, standard deviation)

                                average             SD
Extreme antisemites   -.2282            .8840
Non-antisemites         -.1141          1.0040
Antisemites                 .0832            .9314
Stereotypers                .1215          1.0079

The table shows that there is no linear correlation between economic-social resources and the strength of prejudice. Extreme antisemites are over-represented in groups lacking economic-social resources, but non-antisemites also achieved a below average score. However, all indicators suggest that groups disposing of a great amount of economic-social resources are very much represented among the stereotypers. In general, it would seem that only the highest status and highest income groups differ from the other groups: in this group anti-Jewish prejudice is less common, while economic stereotypes linked to the Jews are more frequent.²¹

Finally, we examined whether social mobility influences antisemitic prejudice, as a number of theoretical and research works had earlier concluded.²² Comparing the social status of respondents with the social status of their parents, we found that inter-generational mobility had no effect on the strength of antisemitic prejudice.

The impression being formed of the correlation between antisemitism and the social and demographic indicators can be refined somewhat on the basis of our analysis of the factors underlying the correlation between the strength of antisemitic prejudice and the social-demographic data or disposable economic-social resources. Regression analysis, in which we defined as the dependent variable the secondary factor formed out of the factors representing the three dimensions of antisemitic prejudice — stereotyping, social distance from the Jews, and the inclination to discriminate against the Jews — and in which we included as independent variables gender, age, place of residence, status, and economic-social resources, demonstrated that all these variables explain only to a negligible extent (R² = 2.5%) the variance of the dependent variable. A signirole in the explanation is played by two variables: place of residence and economic-social resources.²³  We can, therefore, conclude that residence in Budapest and a lack of economic-social resources do play a role in explaining the holding of antisemitic views, but the weight of these factors is not particularly great.

Summarizing the results of the analysis, we can state that among the social-demographic and resource-linked variables it is primarily the place of residence that influences the degree of antisemitism: antisemitic prejudice is much more common among Budapest residents than among residents of other settlements. Characteristically, antisemites are to be found in those groups whose economic-social resources are declining; but the economic-social resources of non-antisemites are also below average. Concerning economic-social resources, the highest average score was measured among the group of stereotypers.²⁴ All these data point to the existence of two different types of prejudice: one spreading among the middle classes and one among the lower sections of society.

Though a direct correlation between deprived sections of society and antisemitism is often supposed, the results of our survey indicate the conclusions of other researchers according to which it is not the objective amount of disposable economic-social resources but the subjective feeling of deprivation, insecurity of status, and the feeling of anomie which can generate antisemitism and similar forms of prejudice can be valid in Hungary, too. Rapid and profound changes in society — and the associated changes in status and crises of values — can lead to a prejudice-based rationalization of events among certain groups. The failure of the Communist systems and its consequences have doubtless represented such social changes. The political transition that followed the collapse of the old system placed great burdens even on those whose economic circumstances did not deteriorate dramatically: their position in society and the identities that were founded on this position were severely shaken; the chances of certain groups moving upward or downward in society were altered; earlier social regulations and norms lost their validity; previously unknown conditions developed; and frequently the consequences of various formerly effective social actions and life strategies became unpredictable. Such considerations led us to examine whether the strength of antisemitism depended on the subjective effect of social changes occurring in the course of the change of system.

c) First, we examined the relationship between the subjective feeling of deprivation and a disposition to antisemitic prejudice. When interviewing people, we posed four questions concerning their judgment of changes — negative or positive — in their own and in most other people’s financial position since 1990; we also asked whether they expected an improvement or a deterioration in the future for their own group and for society as a whole. As table 24 demonstrates, while the proportion of extreme antisemites among those who believed that the situation of their own group or that of other groups had deteriorated significantly in recent years is greater than for the whole sample, the differences between the groups in these questions are either hardly significant or insignificant. This was also demonstrated by the fact that when we combined the four questions into one factor and calculated the factorscore averages of the variously prejudiced groups, we found that, although the average for the antisemitic group was higher than that for the other groups, the differences between the group averages were not statistically significant.²⁵

Table 24.  Subjective deprivation in the antisemitism scale groups
(percentage)
 

.	non- antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
- How has your personal financial situation developed since the change of system?
Worsened considerably	32	34	21	13
- How has the financial situation of the majority of people developed since the change of system?
Worsened considerably	32	37	20	11
- How do you think your personal financial situation will develop in the next five years?
Worsen considerably	36	33	19	12
- How do you think the financial situation of the majority of people will develop in the next five years?
Worsen considerably	33	36	21	10

The prejudice enhancing role of subjective deprivation is indicated, however, by another piece of data: while 47% of members of the total downwardly mobile group (cf. social status of their parents) were of the opinion that their financial position had worsened since the change of political system, among the downwardly mobile antisemites (in the combined group of antisemites and extreme antisemites) this proportion was 60 %.

d) As the next step, we examined the relationship between a feeling of anomie and prejudice, and attempted to adapt Leo Srole’s scale of anomie to Hungarian conditions (Srole 1956). According to Srole, anomie provokes prejudice against minority groups, and he measured the feeling of anomie on the basis of acceptance or rejection of five notions: community leaders are indifferent to the requirements of the individual, and they neglect the problems of community members; little can be achieved in society, which is basically unreliable and chaotic; social norms and values are losing their validity, and life seems to become meaningless; one’s originallife goals cannot be realized, and average people are retrogressing from the goals they have already achieved; and the individual seeks social or psychological support among his fellows in vain.²⁶ These notions portray defencelessness in social and political relations, loss of norms and perspectives, and personal frustration in interpersonal relationships as sources for the feeling of anomie. In the course of our survey we presumed that these feelings became significantly stronger in certain groups after the failure of the Communist system. As a first step we attempted to measure the relative strengths of these types of anomic feelings by examining the degree of acceptance of notions that had regularly appeared in Hungarian society in the years following the collapse of old system. We hypothesized that the feeling of personal frustration and isolation would appear at most in the reactions to growing social inequality, in the feeling of being disdained by those who are higher on the social ladder; the feeling of social defenselessness and the devaluation of norms in doubts concerning the state of law and order, the feeling that society is chaotic, the rules unreliable, and personal goals cannot be achieved in a honest way; the distrust toward politics and fear of the future in the rejection of the new democratic political system and the nostalgia for the “calculable” and “transparent” past, for the homeliness of the familiar, old Communist system.

Table 25.  Measurement of anomic attitudes
(percentage)
 

Personal frustration	rather agree	rather disagree	don’t know, no answer
People with university education generally look down on others	33	60	7
Rich people generally look down on others	67	27	6
People who obtain a little bit of power generally start looking down on others	62	32	6

Social defenselessness, loss of norms	rather agree	rather disagree	don’t know,  no answer
It doesn’t matter that there are laws; they will be distorted and perverted until those in power are proved right	79	15	6
Nowadays most criminals escape punishment	79	15	6
Nowadays even the courts do not serve justice to the people	64	20	16
In this country it is only possible to get rich by dishonest means	60	35	5

Distrust towards politics and democratic institutions	rather agree	rather disagree	don’t know,  no answer
Parties exist for politicians to make careers	67	26	7
Today there is more freedom than under the Socialist system	67	25	8
Parliamentary democracy and the multi-party system are not suitable for solving the most pressing problems in an effective manner	37	48	15
Since 1990 people have had more opportunity to influence the fate of the country	44	48	8
The multparty system hinders a national joining of forces and the development of national unity	34	50	16

Nostalgia for the past	rather agree	rather disagree	don’t know, no answer
Under the old system it was easier to orient oneself among the regulations and laws than it is now	69	21	10
In the Socialist system people could have more confidence in the future	68	24	8
Under the Kádár system the country’s leaders paid more attention to the opinions of ordinary people	45	44	11

As the first step, we formed factors (principal components) out of the statements representing the various types of frustration. Factor analysis substantiated our supposition that we were faced with notions expressing common content.²⁷ Subsequently, we examined the results achieved by the various groups of the antisemitism scale on the factors.

Table 26. Anomie and antisemitism
(factorscore averages in the antisemitism scale groups)
 

.	personal frustration	social defenselessness, loss of norms	distrust towards politics and democratic institutions	nostalgia for the past
Sig. F.	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0389
Non-antisemites	-.1358	-.0208	-.0498	-.0396
Stereotypers	-.1141	-.1465	-.1401	-.0451
Antisemites	.2132	.1087	1762	.0926
Extreme antisemites	.5741	.2864	.3253	.2488

As the scores demonstrate, extreme antisemites comprise the most anomic groups in all four cases: in all four factors their group achieved the highest scores. On the factor measuring personal frustration and social defencelessness the scores of the group of extreme antisemites and antisemites is statistically significantly higher than the anomie measured in the group of non-antisemites and stereotypers (the result was different in the political anomie factor: here the average score of the antisemite group differs significantly only from the average of the stereotypers’ group, and not from the average of the non-antisemites). Average scores, however, increase in line with the strength of antisemitic prejudice only on the personal frustration factor; on the other three factors, the average scores of the stereotypers’ group are lower than the scores of the non-antisemitic group. This also indicates that the types of frustration that are more closely linked to the social changes tend to be enhanced or weakened by the availability of disposable economic-social resources — because the indicators of social and political
anomie are higher among the non-antisemites than they are among the stereotypers’ group.²⁸ This conclusion suggests that the social and economic position influences the degree of antisemitic prejudice primarily indirectly, e.g., by influencing the inclination to anomic feelings.

Overall the anomie factors do not explain antisemitism to any great extent either: In the course of regression analysis performed on the secondary antisemitism factor, these factors accounted for 5% of variance. When we included the resource factor in the regression, then the explained variance did not increase — which serves to underline what we have already stated.²⁹

e) Theoretical and historical works on antisemitism have discussed in numerous ways the relationship between antisemitism and various ideologies and ideological attitudes. Empirical sociological studies have also demonstrated the continued existence of traditional Christian anti-Judaism and religious-based antisemitism in modern societies.³⁰ Research works, such as, for example, a series of studies on the authoritarian personality, have also frequently shown the intertwining of antisemitism with nationalist sentiment and conservative mind-sets. For this reason, in the course of our research we also examined whether there is a correlation between, on the one hand, antisemitism and, on the other hand, religious convictions, strong national sentiment and conservative attitudes in today’s Hungary.

Table 27.  Religiosity, national sentiment and conservatism, by the strength of antisemitism
(percentage)

a) Strength of religious convictions

.	non-antisemites				stereotypers	antisemites			extreme antisemites
Full sample	33		38			20			9
- I am religious
Rather yes	33				36		22			9
Rather no	34				41		15			10
-The strength of religious convictions
Very religious	34				31		26			9
Religious in my own way	35				36		20			10
-Don’t know whether I am religious	29				51		17			3
Not religious	30				46		15			9
Atheist	40				30		19			11
-Do you consider yourself a member of one of the churches?
Yes	34				37		20			9
No	31				42		18			9
- How often do you attend church?
Several times a week		41		15				36			8
Once a week		31		24				30			15
Once a month		43		37				12			8
Several times a year		36		40				18			6
Once a year		34		40				19			9
Never		30		40				19			11

b) National sentiment

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
- People with national sentiment should receive greater influence
Strongly disagree	32	41	20	7
Disagree	31	43	22	4
Neither agree nor disagree	36	40	17	7
Agree	35	34	20	11
Strongly agree	28	33	23	16
- More should be done in the interests of Hungarians living in neighboring countries
Strongly disagree	30	39	23	8
Disagree	27	43	18	12
Neither agree nor disagree	35	40	18	7
Agree	37	35	19	9
Strongly agree	34	34	21	11
- (I possess) strong national sentiments
Yes	30	36	23	11
No	36	41	15	8

c) Conservative attitudes

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
- It should be possible to abstain from military service on religious grounds
Rather agree	35	41	17	7
Rather disagree	33	35	21	11
- I support the death penalty for serious offenses
Rather yes	33	37	20	10
Rather no	37	41	14	8
- I consider homosexuality to be an unnatural and immoral thing
Rather yes	33	36	21	10
Rather no	35	42	16	7
- I would impose a strict prison sentence on drug-users
Rather yes	32	36	21	11
Rather no	35	41	18	6

The data in the table demonstrate a correlation between antisemitic attitudes and religious belief. Among those who are not religious, the proportion of stereotypers is significantly greater than among the population as a whole. Among those who are very religious, those who abide by the teachings of the church and frequently attend church there are, on the one hand, significantly more antisemites, and, on the other hand, among those who attend church once a week significantly more extreme antisemites, than there are among the population as a whole.³¹ The degree of prejudice, therefore, does not increase in line with religiosity: stereotypers are less religious than non-antisemites, and antisemites are more strictly religious than extreme antisemites. In general, we can state that the strength of antisemitism does not seem to be directly linked to religious belief but to the practice of such belief within the traditional framework of religious institutions: whereas the proportion of antisemites is only slightly higher among those who consider themselves to be religious than it is among the non-religious, the proportion of antisemites is much higher among those who attend church once a week than it is among other groups.

A significant correlation is also demonstrated between national sentiment and the degree of antisemitic prejudice. There are significantly greater numbers of extreme antisemites and antisemites among those with strong national sentiments than there are among the full sample; and concerning extreme antisemites the situation is the same in the case of the other two questions, although in the case of the question relating to the Hungarian minorities there is no real difference between the various groups.³² Conservative attitudes serve to differentiate the groups to the least extent: here, extreme antisemites are significantly over-represented only among those wishing to impose prison sentences on drug-users.³³

When examining the correlation between ideological attitudes and antisemitic prejudice we performed the same calculation that we used in our analysis of the relationship between personal frustration and prejudice. First, we constructed principal components from the items used to measure the ideological attitudes. Then we examined the scores achieved by the various groups of the antisemitism scale on these factors and deterwhich groups’ average scores differed from each other to a statistically significant extent.

Table 28. Ideological attitudes and antisemitism
(Factorscore averages in the antisemitism scale groups)
 

.	religiosity	national sentiment	conservatism
Sig. F.	.0097	.0002	.0004
Non-antisemites	.0300	.0066	-.0502
Stereotypers	-.1199	-.0965	-.0992
Antisemites	.1484	.1320	1662
Extreme antisemites	.0106	.3304	.2596

The conclusion of this analysis was that in all three factors the lowest scores were received by the stereotypers’ group; thus this group is the least religious, the least conservative and the least characterized by strong national sentiment. The group’s scores for strength of religious convictions were particularly below average. The group of non-antisemites achieved near average scores in all three principal components. The antisemites are characterized by considerably higher than average religiosity and by higher than average national sentiment and conservatism, while the extreme antisemites are average in terms of religiosity, but considerably more conservative and nationalistic than the average. Thus, there is no linear correlation between the strength of religious convictions and antisemitic prejudice, although antisemites do tend to be more religious than non-antisemites, and the increasing strength of national sentiment and conservatism is clearly accompanied by an increase in the strength of antisemitism. According to the results of the regression analysis, taken together the ideological factors account for just 4% of the antisemitism factor variance.³⁴

f) In the above, we examined the relationship between antisemitism and those ideological attitudes which in the modern era often accompany antisemitic mind-sets. We identified such ideological attitudes as being the joint content of in part ideological self-placements and in part characteristic opinions. As scholarly works on antisemitism have discussed in depth, antisemitic views may amount to more than the manifestations of certain personality types or certain attitude combinations, for they may also serve to evoke in a symbolic manner consciously held ideological-political positions.³⁵ For this reason, we examined whether there was a correlation between consciously held ideological-political positions and antisemitic views in the surveyed population.

Table 29. The relationship between political-ideological self-placement and antisemitism
(percentage)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
-I am religious
Rather yes	33	36	23	9
Rather no	34	40	16	10
-I possess strong national sentiments
Rather yes	30	36	23	11
Rather no	36	41	15	8
-I hold conservative views
Rather yes	32	30	25	13
Rather no	33	41	18	8
-I hold right-wing views
Rather yes	27	37	25	11
Rather no	34	39	18	9

-I hold liberal views
Rather yes	34	40	18	8
Rather no	33	34	22	11
-I hold left-wing views
Rather yes	30	40	20	10
Rather no	33	38	20	9

An analysis of the above data showed that there was no correlation between a liberal or left-wing self-placement and a certain position on the antisemitism scale, although antisemites were slightly fewer than average among the liberals and slightly more numerous than average among the non-liberals. A religious or right-wing self-placement correlates weakly but significantly with the degree of antisemitism. There was a stronger correlation between self-characterization as a conservative — or as someone with strong national sentiments — and antisemitism: the proportion of antisemites and extreme antisemites was significantly higher than average among people with strong national sentiments and conservatives. Non-antisemites were significantly over-represented among people who did not consider themselves to hold strong national sentiments, while the proportion of stereotypers was significantly higher than average among those who did not consider themselves to be conservatives.³⁶ The power of political-ideological self-placement as a explanatory factor is also negligible: the positions included in the examination explain 3% of the variance of the secondary antisemitism factor.³⁷

g) Explanations of antisemitism include those theories which conceive anti-Jewish prejudice as a particular manifestation of xenophobia. Such theories include some of the personality psychological interpretations of antisemitism, the theory of the authoritarian personality, and a good number of social psychological group conflict theories. In the course of our research, we also examined the extent to which anti-Jewish prejudice is accompanied by other forms of anti-minority prejudice, and whether or not it can be explained as a manifestation of general xenophobic attitudes.

We used two commonly-employed series of items to measure xenophobia. In the first series of questions, we inquired whether or not the respondent would consent to members of various ethnic groups moving into his neighborhood; in the second series of questions, we measured the degree of sympathy or hostility towards these same groups. In addition, we asked whether or not restrictions should be placed on the number of “colored immigrants” entering the country. We received the following distribution of answers to the questions.

Table 30. Would you restrict the number of colored immigrants living in the country?
(percentage)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
Rather yes	30	33	23	14
Rather no	36	42	17	5

Table 31. Would you consent to a .... moving into your neighborhood
( percentage of ‘would not’ respondents)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
Arab	29	34	22	15
Bosnian refugee	29	32	24	15
Chinese	31	32	24	13
Black person	28	33	23	16
Romanian	28	34	23	15
Minority German	31	29	23	17
Jews	19	25	22	34

The table clearly demonstrates that antisemites are significantly more prejudiced — against all of the ethnic groups — than non-antisemites, but the difference is greatest, of course, concerning the Jews.

Table 32. How much do you like or dislike?
(average scores on a ‘1 = dislike strongly’ - ‘9 = like strongly’ scale)
 

.	non-antisemites		stereotypers	antisemites		extreme antisemites		average
Arabs	3.96	3.96			3.65		2.80		3.83
Serbs	3.68	3.71			3.34		2.92		3.58
Black people	4.37	4.36			3.94		3.13		4.19
Romanians	3.60	3.73			3.35		2.60		3.58
Chinese	4.40	4.38			4.02		3.51		4.24
Jews	6.14	5.81			5.12		3.59		5.54

Thus, based on the data of the thermometer scale, respondents “liked” only the Jews (as well as members of the German minority in Hungary, who do not appear in the table). These two groups were the only ones to achieve average scores greater than five. The data also indicate that, with regard not only to the Jews but also to all the other listed ethnic groups, the antisemites bear greater antipathy than do the non-antisemites; this difference is statistically significant in every case. But antisemites still harbor less hostility towards the Jews than they do towards the other groups. (In the two antisemitic groups, only the Germans received a higher average score than the Jews).

The next step in our examination was to establish — applying principal component analysis — a xenophobia factor from the above twelve items (we naturally ignored the questions relating to the Jews). The average scores of the antisemitism scale groups in this factor corresponded to the results already shown above: the scores of the antisemitic groups differed significantly from those of the non-antisemitic groups.³⁸ The relatively high correlation (.3708; p= .000) between the xenophobia factor and the secondary antisemitism factor also demonstrates the close relationship between the two attitudes.

Table 33. Xenophobia and antisemitism

(Factorscore averages of the antisemitism scale groups on xenophobia factor)

Non-antisemites         -.1197
Stereotypers              -.1716
Antisemites                 .2316
Extreme antisemites     .8256

A Causal Model of Antisemitism

In the above we examined whether we could demonstrate a relationship between the strength of antisemitism and the seven grof variables — social and demographic variables, lack of economic-social resources, subjective deprivation, anomie, ideological attitudes, political-ideological self-placement, and xenophobia. The results of the examination showed the existence of a relationship between each of these variables and antisemitism, although the strength of the relationship in the case of some of the groups of variables differed. In the following, we seek to determine to what extent these variables may account for the strength of antisemitism if we correlate them at the same time with the antisemitism variable — and do this in such a way that we eradicate the effects arising out of their mutual relationship.

As the first step in the examination, we established two secondary factors (principal components) — the anomie factor and the conservatism factor — from the factors measuring the feeling of anomie (personal frustration, social defensiveness, loss of norms, distrust towards politics and democratic institutions, and nostalgia for the past) and the factors measuring ideological attitudes (conservative mind-set, strong religious convictions, national sentiment).³⁹ Subsequently, we examined to what extent the anomie factor, the conservatism factor, and the xenophobia factor, as well as the five social-demographic factors, together explain the strength of antisemitism. Applying regression analysis, we can draft the following path model.

Diagram 1.   Causal model of the explanation of antisemitism
                    (regression analysis; stepwise method; beta coefficients)
 

According to the results of the analysis the strength of antisemitism is determined primarily by xenophobia. The second most important determinant was the place of residence: the strength of antisemitism increased with residence in the capital city (In the model the domicile variable has two values: Budapest and other settlements.) The third factor directly determining the strength of antisemitism is the feeling of anomie; conservatism is in fourth place. Anomie, however, did not only affect antisemitism directly, but also indirectly by inducing xenophobia.

As we have seen, among the social-demographic indicators only the place of residence has a stronger and the resource variable a weaker direct effect on antisemitism; the effect of the other variables is indirect. The relative availability of economic-social resources — status, income, wealth — has an effect on the feeling of anomie and conservatism. The effect is what we expected: the poorer people are and the lower their social status, the more they are inclined to conservatism and anomie. There is a link between age and both xenophobia and conservatism: among older people xenophobia and conservative attitudes tend to be stronger than they are among younger people. Xenophobia decreases with the level of educational qualification, while the degree of conservatism is greater among residents of small settlements than it is among residents of larger settlements.

Based on the path model, if we examine only those factors which are in a causal relationship with antisemitism, we gain the impression that antisemitism is a phenomenon of the cities, which predominantly appears in poor, uneducated, frustrated, and xenophobic groups.

The Inner Structure of the Antisemite Group

If, however, we examine the model more closely, we may perceive two further factors in need of explanation, which in part contradict this impression. First, it is apparent that the correlation between two attitudes inducing antisemitism, the feeling of anomie and conservatism, is negative, i.e., as anomie increases so conservatism decreases, and vice versa. Thus, it would seem that while both anomie and conservatism are among the factors inducing antisemitic attitudes, these two factors may affect different groups; some groups may be inclined to accept antisemitic views because of the feeling of anomie, while other groups may do so because of conservative attitudes. Indeed, it may even be that anomie and conservatism generate different types of antisemitism.

The other explanatory phenomenon is that while the size of the place of residence directly correlates with antisemitism, the indirect effect of this factor, exerted through conservatism, is negative: if we use a more refined (four level) settlement variable, we can see that the residents of smaller settlements are more conservative than urban populations — and yet conservative attitudes represent one of the causes of antisemitism. Thus, it is possible that those who are susceptible to antisemitism owing to their conservative attitudes, may be different from those who are antisemites for other reasons.

We set out to test the two hypotheses by examining which groups could be formed — from among the surveyed population — on the basis of their scores on the seven primary factors (principal components) that we had used earlier to establish the secondary conservatism and anomie factors.

Table 34. Cluster groups, by frustration and conservatism factors
(factorscore averages)
 

.	integrated left & liberal	frustrated left	integrated conservative	frustrated right
Personal frustration	-.5320	.3568	-1.0209	.5639
Social defenselessness, loss of norms	-.6667	.3826	-.8971	.5137
Distrust towards politics and democratic institutions	-.8644	.4163	-.7576	.5123
Dostalgia for the past	-.7408	.3900	-.6856	.4417
Conservative attitudes	-1.2906	.1880	.1360	.4325
Strong national sentiment	-.3414	-.7559	.3775	.6907
Religious convictions	-.7734	-.6724	.6789	.5845
N	263 (18 %)	415 (28 %)	278 (19 %)	517 (35 %)

Cluster analysis produced clear results.⁴⁰ The first group — comprising 18% of the population — scored below average on all the factors, and thus members of this group are not characterized by either frustration or conservative attitudes/views. In this group, the proportion of voters for the liberal parties in the Hungarian parliament (Alliance of Free Democrats, League of Young Democrats) was significantly higher than average (in 1995).

The second group (28% of the surveyed population) achieved higher than average scores on all four factors expressing frustration; the attitudes of this group are more conservative than average, but religious convictions and strong national sentiment do not characterize the group. In this group the proportions of left-wing party supporters and of non-voters are significantly higher than average.

Members of the third group (19%) possess strong religious convictions and national sentiments; they are inclined to accept conservative norms, but are not frustrated at all. In 1995, members of this group tended to support the national-conservative, right-centrist parties — the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and to a lesser extent, the Christian Democratic People’s Party.

The fourth group (35%), on the other hand, is profoundly frustrated and conservative in every respect. In this group, the proportions of supporters of the Independent Smallholders’ Party and, to a lesser extent, of the Christian Democratic People’s Party, were significantly higher than average.

The four groups also differ as regards their social-demographic characteristics. In the first group, the proportions of under fifty-year-olds, residents of Budapest, the highly educated, and people with high status possessing numerous economic-social resources and cultural assets, are significantly higher than average. Males are also over-represented in this group; in the second group, there are more than average residents of provincial towns, skilled workers, lower middle class people, people possessing relatively few cultural assets, and men; in the third group, residents of provincial towns, people possessing relatively large amounts of economic-social resources and cultural assets, and middle-aged people are significantly over-represented, while in the fourth group — the most frustrated and conservative group — the proportions of over seventy-year-olds, residents of villages, people possessing few economic-social resources and cultural assets, people of low status, and women, deviate significantly from the average.

Thus, the surveyed populationis divided into two large groups according to the level of frustration and anomie, while the conservative and less conservative sub-groups are to be found in both large groups. In the non-frustrated and non-anomie group, on the one hand, there are a particularly large number of people that can be called liberals and possess better social positions and better opportunities. On the other hand, conventional and conservative sections of society — possessing relatively good positions — also characteristically belong in this group. Members of the frustrated-anomie group are characteristically people in a worse position, people of a deprived background possessing fewer opportunities for social advancement, those who hold conservative views but who reject ideological attitudes that may be called conservative (i.e., strong national sentiment and religious convictions), people who are attracted to the Socialist Party, and those who are positioned low down on the social status hierarchy with few opportunities for social advancement and holding traditional attitudes and views.

Indicative differences between these groups are also evident concerning xenophobia and the degree of prejudice.

Table 35. The strength of antisemitic, anti-Gypsy and xenophobic prejudice in the cluster groups established on the basis of anomie and conservatism
(factorscore averages)⁴¹
 

.	integrated left & liberal		frustrated left	integrated conservative			frustrated right
Antisemitism	-.2714	.0422			-.1818	.2053
Hostility to Gypsies	-.3218	.0520			-.1223	.1876
Xenophobia	-.5032	.0637			-.2556	.3598

As table 35 demonstrates, both the first group and the third group exhibit low levels of prejudice; in the second group the degree of prejudice is somewhat higher than the sample average, while in the fourth group, levels of all three forms of prejudice — antisemitism, hostility to Gypsies, and xenophobia — greatly exceed the average for the Hungarian adult population.

The strength of antisemitic prejudice in the various cluster groups is characterized by the fact that while in the fourth group the proportion of extreme antisemites — and the combined proportion of extreme antisemites and antisemites — greatly exceed the average, in the third group non-antisemites — and in the first group stereotypers — are significantly more numerous than the average.

Table 36. The degree of antisemitic prejudice in the cluster groups
(percentage)
 

.	non-antisemites	stereotypers	antisemites	extreme antisemites
Full sample	33	38	20	9
Integrated left & liberal	33	51	11	5
Frustrated left	30	42	18	10
Integrated conservative	41	33	21	5
Frustrated right	32	34	25	13

All this demonstrates the existence of a heightened cause and effect relationship between the combined incidence of anomie and conservative attitudes, and prejudice. Conservative attitudes by themselves do not necessarily lead to antisemitism; indeed, if such attitudes are not coupled with frustration and anomie, then they tend, on the contrary, to imply a low level of prejudice.

Why, however, in the course of the path analysis, did we reach the conclusion that conservatism by itself — and independently of anomie — is capable of inducing antisemitism? An analysis of the conservative groups demonstrated that antisemitism stemming from conservatism is of a particular type. Examining which of the attitudes that make up conservatism was most closely linked to antisemitism, we found that only strong national sentiments exerted a considerable effect on antisemitism. Among those who classified themselves as possessing “strong national sentiments,” the proportion of extreme antisemites was significantly higher than the group average even among the otherwise non-antisemitic integrated conservatives (8% compared with 5%).

This observation was supported by another piece of data which we obtained when performing a more precise examination of the relationship between place of residence and prejudice. Examining the contradiction surrounding the fact that antisemitism appears to be, at one and the same time, a capital city phenomenon and in part induced by conservatism — which tends to be stronger among village groups — we found that although people living in village settlements do incline towards religious-conservative attitudes (more so than urban residents), among Budapest conservatives the proportion of extreme antisemites was significantly higher (19%) than among conservatives as a whole (5%). In addition, it became clear that in the conservative group, the number of antisemites is above average among university graduates and the upper-middle classes. This relationship demonstrates that in sections of society with conservative attitudes, there exists a form of antisemitism that differs in type from the antisemitism that can be interpreted as the manifestation of the xenophobic feelings of frustrated groups. This form of antisemitism, which characterizes the urban, relatively high status and integrated group, is linked to firm ideological attitudes and in all certainty serves as symbolic expression of such attitudes. This form of antisemitism can be considered as the appearance of ideological-political antisemitism. Nevertheless, it seems that only a small section of the population is susceptible to political antisemitism: our calculations indicate that this group comprises certainly not more — and perhaps fewer — than 10% of the extreme antisemites, i.e., about 1% or less of the whole sample.

The results of our examination indicate that 25% of the Hungarian adult population harbor weaker or stronger forms of antisemitic prejudice. Antisemitism in Hungary is currently a phenomenon of the capital city: antisemitic prejudice occurs more frequently among residents of Budapest than among residents of other settlements. Excluding the place of residence, and the possession of economic and social resources, other social-demographic variables do not directly correlate with antisemitic prejudice. Age, education, and disposable economic-social resources do, however, indirectly affect the degree of anti-Jewish prejudice — by way of other attitudes. Xenophobia is more common among older and less educated groups; and antisemitism is one of the manifestations of this phenomenon. Our observations indicate that in sections of society with diminishing economic-social resources the feeling of anomie is stronger than in other social groups disposing of a greater number of such resources. In turn, anomie induces antisemitic feelings both directly and indirectly, by generating xenophobia. In combination, anomie and conservative attitudes strengthen, in particular, the inclination towards extreme antisemitism. By themselves, religious-conservative views and attitudes do not induce antisemitism. The inclination towards antisemitism among groups with such religious-conservative attitudes is most pronounced among those groups in which the feeling of anomie is strong or in which antisemitism performs the function of a code for the expression of ideological and political positions. In this last group, which amounts to about 1% of the total adult population, antisemitism is a political phenomenon.

---

Endnotes
 
 

1.   Attitudes toward Jews in Different Countries. Data from American Jewish Committee-Sponsored Surveys (New York: American Jewish Committee June 1995).
2.   Hilde Weiss and Christoph Reinprecht: Demokratischen Patriotismus oder ethnischer Nationalismus in Ost-Mitteleuropa (Vienna: Böhlau, 1998), p. 85.
3.   This research was conducted by Zsolt Enyedi, Ferenc Erus, and Zoltán Fábián. See Zoltán Fábián - Endre Sik. ‘Az eluítéletesség és a tekintélyelvuség a mai Magyarországon’ (Prejudice and authoritarianism in Hungary today). In Andorka Rudolf, Kolosi Tamás, Vukovich György (eds.), Társadalmi riport (Social report), 1996. Budapest, TÁRKI – Századvég, pp. 381–413.
4.   The survey was performed among a sample of 1.000 people (representative of the Hungarian adult population). The analysed sample: N= 988. Each of the four questions was measured on a four-grade Likert-scale. A higher average expresses more prejudiced attitudes.
5.   For details of the results of the research, see András Kovács. A különbség köztünk van. Az antiszemitizmus és a fiatal elit (The difference is between us. Antisemitism and the young elite). Cserépfalvi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1997; ‘Antisemitism and the Young Elite’. In E. Krausz and G. Tulea (eds.). Sociological Papers, vol. 5. No.3. 1996. Sociological Institute for Community Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem

‘Jews and Hungarians: Group Stereotypes Among Hungarian University Students.’ In  East European Jewish Affairs, vol. 23. No.2. Winter 1993, pp. 51-60.
6.   The survey was performed by Gallup/Hungary Közvéleménykutató Intézet. The research was sponsored by OTKA (National Scientific Research Foundation), Soros-Foundation, Ministry of Education and Culture, Budapest City Council, Budapest Bank, and the American Jewish Committee. The analysis of data and the recent publication was supported by the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Professor Maria Szekely for her active participation in the data analysis.
7.   For details of the survey procedures and results, see András Kovács: ‘Antisemitism and the Young Elite.’ In E. Krausz and G. Tulea (eds.). Sociological Papers, vol. 5. No.3. 1996. Sociological Institute for Community Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem, pp.4-15
8.   See András Kovács. ‘Antisemitism and the Young Elite.’ In E. Krausz and G. Tulea (eds.). Sociological Papers, vol. 5. No.3. 1996. Sociological Institute for Community Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem, p. 9.
9.   We also measured the coherence of the scales using Cronbach alpha. The scores for each scale were the following:
1. The ‘prejudiced stereotyping’ scale: .7820
2. The ‘emotional saturation of prejudice and social distance’ scale: .7204
3. The ‘inclination to discriminate’ scale: .4769
It can be seen that in the case of the first two scales, this indicator also shows the coherence of the scales, i.e. the two scales do measure just one dimension. In the case of the ‘inclination to discriminate’ scale, the indicator shows weak coherence, but based on factor analysis and correlation analysis, we concluded that for our analyses this scale could be considered coherent. The mutual correlation between the factors was strongly significant (p = .000).
10.   For the cluster analysis we used the SPSS quickcluster program.
11.   Those placed into the stereotypers’ group received high scores on the stereotyping scale on the basis of significantly higher than average acceptance of five stereotype attributes – cunning, greedy, materialistic, pushy, rapacious. They did not, however, tend to accept the other three stereotype attributes – vengeful, supercilious, aggressive. Apart from acceptance of the traditional Shylock-stereotypes, members of this group do not accept other anti-Jewish stereotypes and opinions; indeed, they even tend to reject antisemitic statements. If we disregard the above five stereotypes, the opinions of this group in the scale questions are more or less identical to those expressed by the non-antisemites’ group, and thus this group can be defined as more non-antisemitic than antisemitic.
12.   In this group, the proportions of  village residents, poorly educated people, people of low status and relatively low income, are significantly above average.
13.    See G. Seltznik and S. Steinberg: The Tenacity of Prejudice. Antisemitism in Contemporary America (New York, Evanston, and London 1969); W. Bergmann and R. Erb: Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1991), pp. 69–113.; H. Weiss: Antisemitische Vorurteile in Österreich. (Vienna: Braumüller, 1987), pp. 54–60.; R. Cohen: ‘What we know and what we don’t know about antisemitism: a research perspective.’ In: Antisemitism in America today, ed. J. R. Chanes (New York: Birch Lane Press Book, 1995), pp. 70–79.
14.   Data in the tables relate to that part of the population which we were able to place in one or another of the antisemitism scale groups (N=1260)
15.   Residents of county towns were included among city residents.
16.   Significance of Chi-square test = .01
17.   The indicator of social status was formed from positions in the educational and employment hierarchies. Thus, highly educated people in management positions were placed in the upper status group; poorly educated people in lower category jobs were placed in the lower group. Groups inbetween were formed on the basis of combinations of the two indicators.
18.   Significance of Chi-square test = .02
19.   The wealth indicator was formed on the basis of household fixed property and durable consumer goods.
20.   The resource-factor (non-rotated principal component) eigenvalue 1.77380; explained variance: 59.1%.

Loading: status: .82640; wealth: .75254; income: .72426
21.   Group average differences are statistically significant between the stereotypers, on the one side, and the extreme antisemites and antisemites on the other (.05 significance)
22.   See, for instance, Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz: Dynamics of Prejudice. New York, 1950. (1980). 164 p.; Theories and research on mobility and prejudice are treated in: W. Bergmann: ‘Group Theory and Ethnic Relations.’ In: W. Bergmann (Ed.): Error Without Trial. Psychological Research on Antisemitism. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1988, pp. 155-161.
23.   The result of the regression analysis (stepwise method): place of residence: beta = -.145, Sig.T= .000; resource: beta = -.116, Sig T = .0001;
24.   As the standard deviation values in table 22 indicate, among the various surveyed groups, the antisemites were the most homogeneous and the stereotypers were the most heterogeneous.
25.   Factorscore (non-rotated principal component) averages of the various antisemitism scale groups (oneway)
                          average           SD
non-antisemites       .0272,        1.0006
stereotypers            .0826         1.0051
antisemites             -.0354,         .9695
extreme antisemites -.1493,        1.0071
26.    On the Srole’s scale see Merton 1957. Ch. 7. Continuities in the theory of social structure and anomie. The indicators of anomie.
27.   The results of factor analysis were the following:

Non-rotated principal components (meansub)
1. Personal frustration
Eigenvalue: 1.79038;   Explained variance: 59.7%
Loading:
1) .68701
2) .82068
3) .80304
2. Social defenselessness, loss of norms
Eigenvalue:  1.75429;   Explained variance:  43.9%
Loading:
1) .63855
2) .63268
3) .69429
4) .68134
3. Distrust towards politics and democratic institutions
Eigenvalue: 1.64527;   Explained variance:  32.9 %
Loading:
1)  .43108
2) -.60719
3)  .60548
4) -.54137
5)  .65657
4. Nostalgia for the past
Eigenvalue: 1.63113;  Explained variance: 54.4 %
Loading
1)           .73731
2)           .72884
3)           .74585
28.   The correlation of the resource factor is strongly significant with all four anomie factors (p = .000), but the same factor only weakly correlates with the secondary factor that we established from the three factors comprising the items used to measure the three dimensions of antisemitism (p = .029).
29.   The results of regression analysis on the secondary antisemitism factor (stepwise method)

R² = 5 %;  Signif. F =  .0000
Variable             Beta         T          Sig T
Distrust towards politics and
democratic institutions  .115       3.554   .0004
Personal frustration  .150       4.643   .0000
The correlations of social defenselessness, loss of norms and nostalgia for the past  with the dependent variable were not significant.
30.   See, for instance, Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Antisemitism (New York 1966); H. E. Quinley and Charles Y. Glock, Antisemitism in America (New York: Free Press, 1979), Ch. 6; Walter R. Heinz and Steven R. Geiser: „A Cognitive Theory of Antisemitism in the Context of Religious Ideology,” in: Error without Trial. Psychological Research on Antisemitism, ed. W. Bergmann (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 331–55.
31.   Significance of Chi-square test for the four tables, in order: .001; .021; .212; .000.
32.   Significance of Chi-square test for the three tables, in order: .009; .421; .001
33.   Significance of Chi-square test for the three tables, in order: .367; .103; .051
34.   The results of regression analysis on secondary antisemitism factor (stepwise method):

R² = 4 %;  Signif. F =  .0000
Variable              Beta             T        Sig T
Conservatism  .1428      4.914   .0000
National sentiments .1130      3.890   .0001
The relationships between strength of religious conviction and the dependent variable was not significant.
35.   See, for instance, Shulamit Volkov: ‘Antisemitism as cultural code.’ In: Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, XXIII. 1978, pp. 25-45.

Reinhard Rürup: ‘Die ’Judenfrage’ der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und die Entstehung des modernen Antisemitismus.’ In: R. Rürup: Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Fischer Vlg. 1987. 93.-119. esp.  pp. 115-120.
36.   Significance of Chi-square test for the six tables, in order: .0139; .0003; .0005; .0211; .3024; .6334
37.   The results of regression analysis on the secondary antisemitism factors (stepwise method):

R²= 3 %;  Signif. F =  .0000
Variable                              Beta        T          Sig T
Conservatism                     .1089      3.691     .0002
National sentiments             .1117      3.785     .0002
The correlation between the other variables and antisemitism was not significant.
38.   The eigenvalue of the principal component of xenophobia 5, 54; explained variance 46%. The loading of the items constituting the principal component was above .4892.
39.   Both factors were established using principal component analysis.

Anomie factor
Eigenvalue:  2.13789;   Explained distribution: 53.4
Loading:
Distrust toward politics: .75997
Personal frustration: .73105
Social defenselessness: .74818
Nostalgia for the past: .68275
Conservatism factor
Eigenvalue: 1.36477;   Explained distribution: 45.5
Loading:
Conservatism:   .59247
National sentiments:  .67522
Strength of relgious convictions: .74689
40.   We used the quickcluster technique in the analysis.
41.   To measure antisemitism, we used a secondary antisemitism factor. To measure hostility to the Gypsies, we used principal component analysis to establish a factor from six questions on the questionnaire. The questions were the following:

1 - (are you somebody) who loathes the Gypsies;
2 – Would you consent to a Gypsy moving into your neighborhood (negative reply);
(Do you agree that)
3 – the rise in the number of Gypsies poses a threat to society;
4 – everyone has the right to send a child to a school in which there are no Gypsy children;
5 – one can only welcome that there are some places of entertainment which refuse entry to Gypsies;
6 – Sympathy-antipathy thermometer (10 grade scale);
Hostility to Gypsies factor
Eigenvalue: 2.868; Explained distribution: 48%
Loading:
1.  .71211
2.  .74717
3.  .66023
4.  .49495
5.  .72232
6.  .77461

András Kovács, born in Budapest, Hungary. He holds a Ph.D. from the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, where he is professor at the Institute of Sociology.

He published many sociological studies on ethnic stereotypes and antisemitism in communist and post-communist Hungary.

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